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APPENDIX A

COURSES OF ACTION PROPOSED IN THE

1. Indirect Actions

a. Intensify Efforts to Extend Denial of Landing and Overflight Rights to Planes Enroute to Cuba

Advantages

- With a minimum of effort this will deny entry of air craft into Cuba except from bases within sircraft range and in countries friendly to Cuba.
- Avoids necessity of halting aircraft by force with attendant risks.

Disadvantages

- Fails to provide for removal of existing threat or hostile castro government.
 - Dependent upon cooperation of many Allies.
- b. OAS or US Demand Castro Destroy or Remove From the

Hemisphere all Offensive Weapons and Submit to Inspection

and Verification by OAS

wife further heightening of tensions and dangers of 18 19 escalation.

- If successful, achieves objective of obtaining removal 21 of offensive weapons.

Disadvantages

- Fails to remove hostile Castro government.
- Enforcement in sufficient degree to prevent clandestine 24 1 25 eintroduction of offensive weapons would be difficult. 26

Advantager

- improves effectiveness of OAS inspection.

Appendix A


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		`\$* -
Advantages	J	: 5
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Disadvantages - E		1
b. Expansion of current Blocks	de to Toolude Por	16
Advantages - Could eventually be offect		17 18
significantly the offensive mi	e in POL supply stocks	20
- Would eventually bring on of Cuba and the attendant fall - would generate unrest in g	of the Castro governme	
effects on economy and the peop	7 .	26

buld cause Castro to consider removal of the

Appendix A

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A Company of the Comp	1
Pails to remove offensive threat to US expeditiously	5
Would produce effects sufficiently severe to encourage	3
encourage serious retaliatory measures by USSR and/or	4
Cuba.	5.
Directly affects Cuban people through impact on	6.
economy, making US more vulnerable to confermation.	7
Fails to insure removal of the hostile community	4
controlled government from Cuba.	
Requires indefinite continuation of blookade with	
time as Castro regime eliminated and Soviet in Import	
removed.	12
EXPANDING EXISTING BLOCKADE TO INCLUDE ONLY FUELS	13-
RAFT AND MISSILES.	14
dwantages	15
Avoids impact on Cuban economy and people and the	16
resulting criticism of US.	17
Provents increasing stocks of these fuels for Cuba's	18
astanaty weapons.	19
Among ates US restraint and effort to avoid outright	20
conflict.	21
aedvent ages	22
- Fails to eliminate current offensive threat	23
- D 3 not contribute to anti-Castro efforts in Cuba-	24
	•

d. Complete Sea Blockade of all Imports	
Advantages	
- Would lead to economic collapse of Cuba.	
- Avoids direct attack on Cuba with its attendant	
casualties and damage.	· .
- Demonstrates US restraint and avoidance of war.	
- Provides environment for further negotistions in	
removel of offensive weapons.	
Misadvantages	K
- Pails to eliminate existing offensive weapon furest	
in time available.	
- Perpownates tension and promotes incidents which	÷ 1
coul provide the basis for expanding into war.	- 2
- Complete blookage affects Cuban people directly	. 1
rath than being limited principally to the military,	î
Balting Us more vulnerable to condemnation.	. 1
- Even 17 blockage should result in successful	
ins in ions it would leave a hostile communist-controlle	ed 1
Mak to comminue to threaten Western Hemisphere and	1
would not insure against introduction or offensive	2
waspo into Cuba.	
	. 2
- Ties up US forces for an indefinite period.	2
6 ming Blockade to Frevent Entry into and Departure	. 2
Alrers from Cuba	2
/ IVENTAGES	29
C plements sea blocknde by preventing introduction;	20
of important cargo by air.	27
Englates communicating through serial flights be-	28
two : . Da and the rest of the world.	29
- Provides further harasament which might encourage	30
Cas o consider removal of offensive washing	-23

- Might provoke similar USSR reaction elsewhere, e.g. - Provides basis for incidents which might escalate - Not a decisive step in the climination of the Cuban threat or the Castro government. - Would be of indefinite duration. f. Air Strikes Against All Offensive Weapons Sys Missiles and Combat Aircraft, as well as Related Systems as necessary Aiventages stated objective. - Minimizes risks of Cuban attacks on the United States 45 or Allies since entire offensive system is destroyed. 16 Disadvantages 17 - Leaves Cuba in the hands of a hostile communist regime 18 diffication a threat to the Western Hemisphere. 19 a continuing blockade or similar surveillance system capable of preventing the reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba. - Entails essentially the same risks of escalation 23

as an li-out invasion with less promise of achievement

of lasting results.



g. All-Out Invasion of Cuba

Advanta	ges
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- Achieves 03 stated objective (eliminates missiles and sites, combat aircraft and the Castro regime from the Western Hemisphere).
- confidence in US determination to take all necessary, actions to remove threats to the Free World will be materially enhanced with beneficial effects on our Allies and nonaligned nations.
- The communist threat in Latin America would be considerably weakened.
- Re-establishment of Cuba as a free and independent nation with a viable economy will erase in the long run early, criticism of US military actions.

Dissivantages.

- Belated recourse to this course of action would aduce its effectiveness.
 - t. Thitped States might be denounced as an aggressor 18
- Seviets could cause violent reactions in Berlin 20 against US interests throughout the world. 21
- Could lead to general war if the Soviets mis- 22 calculated US intentions and determinations. 23
- W 1c opinion could go against the US instigated by Soviet ropagands media.
- Greater likelihood of Cuban attempts to launch offen 20 sive mi siles, as an act of desperation. This would 27 probably require. Soviet acquiescence which is doubtful 29 in view of the Presidential warning.

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3. Additional courses of action are covered below. Any or	1
all of theme can be taken concurrently with any action directl	A 5
concerned with Cuba. Each is designed to pose the Soviets wit	h 3
a problem of how to proceed, always indicating to the Soviets	4
the choice of removing the offensive weapons from Cuba is the	5
quickest way to remove the irritation.	6
a. Closing US Ports and Airfields to Soviet Ships and	7
Alreraft:	8
Advantages	e o
- Restricts Soviet freedom of movement.	
- Restricts Soviet trade.	
- Reduces Soviet intelligence opportunities.	100
- Reduces the danger of Soviet covert attack.	13
Disadvantages	14
- Reduces communications and contact between the US	15
and USSR,	16
- Reduces US/USSR trade and forces USSR to trade	17
elsewhere.	18
<u> </u>	19
	20
	21
	22
	23
Adventages	24
- would weaken Cuban and Soviet ability to maintain	25
and increase military threat to the United States.	26
- Would tend to weaken control of Castro government	27
and Soviet confidence in it.	-88
Disadvantages	29
- Would require combiderable time to produce desired	30
effect.	31
B Appendix A	
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d. Economic Action. Implement a master offensive economic plan with the primary objective of sharply reducing the flow of industrial, agricultural and military material reaching the USER and its satellites. Concurrently, 17 take action to reduce selected imports from the USSR. 19 ice the economic stability of the USSR. build divert critical USSR resources to undesirable channels, - Would restrict flow of material required to sustain BSSR defense effort. 24 Di .:dvantages Adverse reaction from Allied nations. Heavier load on US resources to fill vacu Success depends on allied cooperation.

Appendix

SCENARIO OF LIMITED ATTACK ON MREM SITES AND JET FIELDS

A. Factual Background

The IREM sites and associated nuclear storage facilities are still under construction and do not constitute a present threat. The present offensive threat appears to be concentrated in the six MREM areas and the five jot fields available to the IL28's.

An eir attack concentrated on these 11 targets, plas defer suppression including the 8 SAN sites immediately producting these eleven targets should therefore deal with the heart of the present offensive threat.

Because of the impossibility of assuring night time surveillance, accounts force to assure disabling of all offensive systems in the eleven target areas during the initial attack should be provided.

What is under discussion in this paper is, therefore, a one 15 de attack of elseven terest areas, accompanied by nacessary 16 defining typersanion. Such an attack might involve approximately 17 defining typersanion. Such an attack might involve approximately 17 defining typersanion.

B: The Problem

To analyze the actions which should have preceded such an attack.

C. Assumptions

It is assumed that:

- 2. The Soviet Union has votoed the U.S. resolution in the Security Council.
- b. We have no evidence that removal or dismantling of existing 20 offensive systems has begun.

D. Possib : Courses of Action

a. To e public and Allied understanding and to increase polit' ility of program.

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publication of progressive series of low level photographs demonstrating continued work or, at minimum, lack of action to remove.

- High level statements reiterating President's pledge that offensive threat must be removed, emphasizing determination to see this done.
 - 3. Warnings to workers to leave areas.
- 4. Intensive explanation to Allies of extent of to base of their scourity that NREM's pose, and inspired of our intended action at earliest time consistent will security.

E T

1. C

2. [] 3. [3. [

o. Expected effectiveness.

the *ttack would damage and destroy virtually all of those and jet aircraft located at the target areas. This will include a large proportion and maybe all of these vehicles now operational in Cuba. Some may now be concealed or ${\tt may}^{\omega}$ be moved and concealed between today and the time of attack.